Introduction
The issue of political independence and sovereignty was a central element in the establishment of the South Pacific Forum in 1971, as four independent island nations moved out of the confines of the South Pacific Commission. Self-determination was extensively debated at the forum throughout the 1980s.
Today, well into the 21st century and the United Nations' Third International Decade for the Eradication of Colonialism, decolonisation has largely faded from the international agenda. Despite this, 16 territories remain on the United Nations' (UN) list of non-self-governing territories, including six in the Pacific: New Caledonia and French Polynesia (under French administration); Tokelau (New Zealand); Pitcairn (United Kingdom); and Guam and American Samoa (United States). Developments in these territories are monitored by the seminars, missions and annual resolutions of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation. The generic term 'territories' is used for convenience, but these dependencies have a variety of political and constitutional structures. France describes its Pacific dependencies as 'collectivities', while Indonesian and Papua New Guinea governments bridle at the suggestion the provinces of Papua, West Papua or Bougainville require 'decolonisation'.
Across the region there are also 'second order' self-determination struggles in postcolonial states that do not fall under the mandate of the UN special committee, such as Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Rapanui (Chile), and West Papua (Indonesia).
While the UN is an important institution for setting human rights norms, it has limited enforcement capacity. The United Nations can act with the support of the administering power, as shown with New Zealand's extensive work with the UN decolonisation unit over Tokelau (Huntsman and Kelihian 2007) . But Paris and Washington have long ignored UN criticism of their colonial policies, prioritising strategic interests such as US military deployments in Guam or France's control of the resources in its seven-million-square-kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone in the Pacific (Mrgudovic 2008) . Moreover, the UN decolonisation unit is starved for funds and staff, and reluctant to implement an assertive agenda.
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Since the end of French nuclear testing in 1996 and the signing of New Caledonia's Noumea Accord in 1998, the Pacific Islands Forum has developed new policies on engagement with the territories. New Caledonia (1999) and French Polynesia (2004) gained forum observer status, then both upgraded to 'associate membership' at the 2006 forum meeting in Apia. Tokelau also upgraded its 2005 observer status to associate membership in 2014. Other nations remain as forum observers, including Timor-Leste (2002) , Wallis and Futuna (2006) and the US dependencies of Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the North Marianas (2011).
The policies of Australia and New Zealand (and, on occasions, other forum members) have constrained a more active role for the forum on decolonisation. Australia has increasingly backed France's regional role and proposed that territories such as New Caledonia should become full members of the forum, even before their final political status is determined.
3 This significant policy shift was endorsed in the 2013 Morauta Review of the Pacific Plan for Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Integration, which argues that original forum priorities such as decolonisation and a nuclear-free Pacific 'have either been resolved or moved to other platforms for debate and determination'. For a more ambitious agenda, see Corbin (2010 Maclellan (2013d) . 4 'The contemporary debate about regionalism has rather less intrinsic association with self-determination. Most of the issues being debated in contemporary Pacific regionalism (trade and transport, for example) are entirely within the mandate of even the non-self-determining territories to resolve, and regionalism would be better served by fully including, not excluding, such territories in the debate and in its implementation ' (Pacific Plan Review 2013, p. 78 These initiatives do not guarantee that independence will be achievedindeed, there are many economic, demographic and strategic barriers to decolonisation for the remaining Pacific territories. The diversity and small size of some territories is a constraint on advancing the decolonisation agenda, and significant parts of some local populations welcome immigration rights, federal grants and other benefits of territorial status (Firth 2013) . In other casesGuam, West Papua, and New Caledonia -indigenous peoples have been made a minority in their own country, constraining advances through elections or referenda.
Rather than assuming a unified Pacific response to decolonisation, it is important to analyse varying reactions by regional organisations and governments. Solidarity can be trumped by countervailing influences, such as Papua New Guinea's and Fiji's relationship with Indonesia or trade ties to the European Union. As new players such as Indonesia and Timor-Leste enter Pacific regional networks, island leaders are forced to juggle more complex obligations. Fiji and Papua New Guinea (PNG) are active members of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation, but growing ties with Asia affect their actions on decolonisation. Melanesian governments have actively supported independence movements in New Caledonia and French Polynesia, but have maintained a diplomatic silence about decolonisation in the US territories.
Canberra's strategic support for Paris and Washington is a significant roadblock to advancing the decolonisation agenda, but the following two studies of contemporary Pacific diplomacy on decolonisation also highlight the tension between principle and national interest for island governments. The first relates to the campaign to have French Polynesia reinscribed on the UN list of nonself-governing territories, in the face of French opposition. The second study looks at ongoing diplomacy through MSG and PSIDS to deal with West Papuan self-determination.
French Polynesia's Reinscription with the United Nations
For many years, the French State has resisted international scrutiny of its colonial policies and ignored international obligations created by UN decolonisation resolutions. As noted in a November 1986 internal memo from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs:
We have never accepted resolutions 1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV), for which we abstained … We have never accepted the legitimacy of the Special Committee on Decolonisation, as directed by resolution 1564 (XVI), to propose the inscription of territories on the list of non-self-governing territories (Regnault 2013, pp. 69-70). In the face of this French opposition, the Pacific Islands Forum played a crucial role in supporting the reinscription of New Caledonia on the UN list in the mid-1980s. 5 The passage of UN General Assembly resolution 41/41 in December 1986 came at the height of armed conflict between the French armed forces and supporters of independence during 1984-1988. France launched extensive diplomatic manoeuvres to ignore, delay and then derail the 1986 forum initiative, using its political and economic weight to encourage countries to abstain or oppose the resolution. Cuba, although a member of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation and the Non-Aligned Movement, was promised a soft ride at the next UN Human Rights Commission. Tunisia and French-speaking African nations were wooed, based on solidarity to 'francophonie'. Newly independent Vanuatu was threatened with aid cuts, while Argentina was lobbied with offers of support in their dispute with United Kingdom over the Falklands/Malvinas islands (Regnault 2013, p. 99) .
After years of lobbying, Australia and New Zealand only joined their island neighbours to support New Caledonia's reinscription after the election of a conservative government in Paris in 1986. Canberra and Wellington shifted policy in part due to concerns about perceived Soviet and Libyan advances in the South Pacific. Australia's then Deputy Prime Minister Lionel Bowen had stated: 'If France drags its feet too much over decolonisation, the independence movement will become increasingly radicalised and perhaps open to Soviet influence and manipulation' (The Australian 1982). (Sarkozy 2010) . Despite this, active Pacific diplomacy led to an historic decision on 17 May 2013, when the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to reinscribe French Polynesia on the UN list of non-self-governing territories.
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The resolution, sponsored by Solomon Islands, Nauru and Tuvalu with support from Vanuatu, Samoa and Timor-Leste, was adopted by the UN General Assembly without a vote. It called on the French government 'as the Administering Power concerned, to intensify its dialogue with French Polynesia in order to facilitate rapid progress towards a fair and effective self-determination process, under which the terms and timelines for an act of self-determination will be agreed'. The French government has maintained its stubborn refusal to acknowledge any role for the UN over self-determination in French Polynesia, failing to meet its obligations as an administering power. Each year, under Article 73e of the UN Charter, colonial powers are required to submit information to the United Nations relating to the economic, social and educational conditions in their 6 French Polynesian independence leader Oscar Temaru was refused entry to this UN seminar in New Caledonia's capital, a symbol of ongoing French opposition to Maohi self-determination. Affairs, Richard Marles, described France as a long-term stable democratic partner in the Pacific and reaffirmed Australian opposition to reinscription: 'We absolutely take our lead from France on this.' 11 Meeting in Rarotonga in August 2012, forum leaders reiterated their support for the principle of self-determination but didn't endorse the call for reinscription.
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A month after the forum, without the restraining influence of Canberra and Wellington, the leaders of Samoa, Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu lined up at the UN General Assembly, calling for action on decolonisation.
Vanuatu's then Prime Minister Sato Kilman called on 'the independent and free nations of the world to complete the story of decolonisation and close this chapter'. He urged the UN 'not to reject the demands for French Polynesia's right to self-determination and progress' (Livtuvanu 2012) .
Samoan Prime Minister Tuilaepa Sailele Malielegaoi told the general assembly: 'In the case of French Polynesia, we encourage the metropolitan power and the territory's leadership together with the support of the United Nations to find an amicable way to exercise the right of the people of the territory to determine their future' (Malielegaoi 2012) . 14 The following month, the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches added its voice, calling on 'France, the United Nations, and the international community to support the reinscription of French Polynesia on the UN list of countries to be decolonised, in accordance with the example of New Caledonia' (WCC Central Committee 2012; see also Bhagwan 2012). This is yet another case of David against Goliath, and the reason why we want our country back on the UN's list of non-self-governing territories. Without the UN as a referee between France and us, this is once again an unfair and uphill battle (Temaru 2013a ).
In February, the PSIDS ambassadors for Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and Nauru formally lodged a draft resolution at the UN General Assembly. France's UN Ambassador Gérard Araud lobbied hard to have the resolution delayed in the hope that it would lapse after May 2013 elections in Papeete. In the interests of compromise, the sponsoring states issued a revised version of the resolution on 1 March, but France sought for weeks to keep the resolution out of the general assembly.
In a memo to Paris, Ambassador Araud stated:
The question raised by Oscar Temaru must remain a franco-French affair, and the United Nations should not interfere with French political life, because France recognises the right of people to self-determination. France challenges the legitimacy of the Decolonisation Committee, as it has done since its creation in 1961 (Regnault 2013, p. 77) .
Some UN member states were astounded by the way France pressed its case. Denouncing the 'violence and condescension' of Araud's interventions, Temaru wrote to President Hollande on 27 March, calling on him to bring the ambassador to heel:
I would draw to your attention the growing frustration and incomprehension over France's position, which we have been informed of by several UN member states … The French pressure towards the President of the General Assembly is similarly perceived as the denial of the democracy that is at the heart of the General Assembly … If some of your confreres in the P5 [permanent members of the Security Council] seem to be accepting the French action on our dossier, others have shared their astonishment with us (Temaru 2013b ).
French Polynesia's local elections on 5 May 2013 saw the defeat of President Temaru's UPLD coalition and the return of long-serving leader Gaston Flosse (since removed from office for misuse of public funds). After his election, Flosse immediately wrote to the president of the UN General Assembly in an unsuccessful attempt to delay action on the resolution. France's ambassador boycotted the session on 17 May -but the resolution was passed without a recorded vote.
Britain, the United States, Germany and the Netherlands all disassociated themselves from the decision. Fearful of a growing regional debate about West Papua, Indonesia's representative also stressed that the 'adoption was solely based on a specific historical context and should not be misinterpreted as precedence by other territories whose cases were pending with the Decolonisation Committee'.
Regional Diplomacy and West Papua
The diplomacy of decolonisation has bedevilled Pacific governments and regional organisations in recent years. While they have actively supported decolonisation for 'blue water' European colonies like French Polynesia, many governments have been reluctant to address struggles for self-determination in postcolonial nations such as Indonesia and PNG.
Since its founding in 1988, the MSG has actively supported the Kanak independence movement in New Caledonia. Indeed, the Front de Libération Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front (FLNKS)), rather than the Government of New Caledonia, is the full member of the sub-regional body. At the 2013 MSG summit, FLNKS spokesperson Victor Tutugoro was appointed as MSG chair, taking the role at a crucial time as the French dependency moves to a referendum on self-determination, scheduled for 2018. The MSG has also established an FLNKS unit in its Port Vila secretariat, appointing a Kanak activist as political counsellor.
In contrast to this long-standing solidarity with the FLNKS, the MSG had been largely silent on the more sensitive issue of West Papua -until now.
After more than 100,000 deaths in West Papua, there is significant popular support for West Papuan independence in the independent Melanesian nations. Even after the fall of Suharto's new order regime, there are ongoing human rights abuses by the Indonesian police and military. 15 This has led to new advocacy across Melanesia, with Facebook and other social media spreading information from inside West Papua across the region. This solidarity movement has forced a complex and unresolved debate over relations with Indonesia onto the agenda of recent MSG summits. The MSG's unity has been stressed by this debate, at a time of other trade and diplomatic disputes (Webb-Gannon and Elmslie 2014). There have been some tensions between the larger states of PNG and Fiji -which are moving closer 15 Dominic Berger says, 'Reducing political tensions and ending human rights abuses in Papua remained elusive throughout [SBY's] tenure' (Berger 2015, p. 230). to Jakarta -and Vanuatu and the FLNKS, which openly express solidarity with the West Papuan nationalist movement (with the Solomon Islands wavering between) (Maclellan 2015b, pp. 10 -11).
Despite these rifts, the MSG's new engagement contrasts with the silence of the Pacific Islands Forum over the last decade. For nearly 30 years after its founding, the forum avoided the issue of West Papua. Action was always constrained by governments in Australia and PNG, which reaffirm the 'territorial integrity' of Indonesia and (incorrectly) state that Indonesia has always held sovereignty over West Papua. 16 Trade links are growing between Canberra, Port Moresby, Suva and Jakarta, adding to other strategic concerns, such as PNG's control of its land border and Canberra's fixation with boat people.
Despite this, forum leaders could not ignore the fall of the Suharto dictatorship in 1998, Timor-Leste's independence and the organising by West Papuan nationalists that created a brief 'Papua Spring' in Jayapura at the beginning of the 21st century.
17 At the September 2000 UN Millennium Summit in New York, Nauru, Vanuatu and Tuvalu were the first countries to declare support for West Papuan self-determination at the United Nations.
Four West Papuan activists were given official delegate status at the October 2000 forum in Kiribati as members of the Nauru delegation. At the Tarawa forum, Vanuatu, Nauru and other countries supported the push for human rights in the troubled country, even as they deferred to Australian and PNG sensitivities by acknowledging Indonesia's sovereignty. Forum Chair President Teburoro Tito of Kiribati said: 'Personally, I have great sympathy for the cause of the West Papuan people, just on the basis of culture alone.'
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The forum issued an unprecedented statement calling for peaceful dialogue on the future of the country and an end to human rights abuses. At the time, Papua Presidium member FranzAlbert Joku welcomed the statement: ' After four decades, we are back in our natural habitat, the South Pacific.' Jakarta's bid for greater involvement in the MSG reflects Indonesia's mounting diplomatic efforts in the region. For many years, the Indonesian embassy in Port Moresby was the main hub for activity in forum island countries, with Indonesian officials lobbying the islands from embassies in Canberra, Wellington, Beijing and Tokyo (from 1974 until 2002, Indonesian diplomats travelled to Fiji from Wellington, until an embassy was opened in Suva).
Today, Jakarta is deploying more effort on the ground, to build economic ties but especially to counter West Papuan diplomacy. Former independence activists FranzAlbert Joku and Nick Messet now act as Indonesian diplomats and join delegations to regional and international summits, to showcase Jakarta's initiatives and argue against independence.
On the international stage, Indonesia, PNG and Fiji are all members of the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation. The two Pacific countries use the special committee as a platform to support the FLNKS, but join Indonesia in opposition to calls for West Papua to be relisted with the UN.
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In contrast, the Kanak independence coalition has long supported a fellow liberation movement in West Papua, wary of Indonesia's growing role in the MSG. Outgoing MSG chair Victor Tutugoro of the FLNKS told the author in 2015: 'For the FLNKS, the MSG is an organisation of Melanesian countries. As I see it, Indonesia is not part of the Melanesian bloc.'
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Vanuatu too has long backed the West Papuan nationalist movement with practical and diplomatic aid, hosting an office for the West Papua nationalist movement. In 2011, the Sato Kilman Government briefly moved closer to Indonesia, with the signing of a Vanuatu-Indonesia Development Cooperation Agreement. These moves dismayed West Papuan activists, especially as the cooperation agreement stressed Indonesian territorial integrity and sovereignty over West Papua, and prohibited Vanuatu from interfering in Indonesia's 'internal affairs'. This decision contributed to a backlash in Port Vila and the election of a new government under Moana Carcasses Kalosil, who proceeded to launch a series of attacks on Indonesia in UN forums.
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In March 2013, the Port Vila-based West Papua National Council for Liberation (WPNCL) lodged a formal membership application to join the MSG, and the existing members began to position themselves.
23 Indonesia provided funds to Fiji for the costs of the UN Special Committee's 2014 Pacific Regional Seminar, held in Nadi. On UN policy on self-determination and the 1969 Act of Free Choice, see Saltford (2002 (Maclellan 2013c ).
After extensive lobbying in the corridors, MSG leaders agreed to defer a decision on the West Papua application. A decision would only be made after a delegation of Melanesian foreign ministers visited Jakarta and Jayapura and reported back to the leaders within six months (Maclellan 2013b Indonesia's diplomatic efforts were rewarded at a special MSG leaders' summit in Port Moresby in June 2014, which deferred the WPNCL application for membership and agreed 'to invite all groups to form an inclusive and united umbrella group in consultation with Indonesia to work on submitting a fresh application'. 30 The summit agreed on a range of activities to ensure 'that the MSG and Indonesia take a more proactive approach in addressing the issue of West Papua and Papua', broadly endorsing Indonesia's Special Autonomy Law and welcoming the involvement of West Papuans in a range of MSG sporting, cultural and development activities. In a major speech the same month, PNG Prime Minister Peter O'Neill said his country needed to do more to address human rights in West Papua. Proposing that his country take a lead in discussions with Indonesia 'in a mature and engaging manner', he added:
Sometimes we forgot our family, our brothers and sisters, especially those in West Papua. I think as a country the time has come for us to speak about oppression of our people. Pictures of brutality of our people appear daily on social media and yet we take no notice. We have the moral obligation to speak for those who are not allowed to talk. We must be the eyes for those who are blindfolded (O'Neill 2015) . At a press conference in Merauke, Jokowi addressed longstanding restrictions on international media travelling to West Papua: 'Starting from today, foreign journalists are allowed and free to come to Papua, just as they can [visit] other regions.' This pledge was immediately undercut by his Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, who confirmed that foreign journalists would still be screened and must obtain permission from the security forces to travel to the highlands:
We'll allow it, on condition that they report on what they see, not go around looking for facts that aren't true from armed groups … There's a lot of news out there that makes it look like [human rights] violations are taking place here all the time, but I don't think that's the case (Jakarta Globe 2015).
The diplomatic issue came to a head at the June 2015 MSG Summit in Solomon Islands, where leaders made an historic decision to expand the MSG's reach. With divergent views continuing amongst the five members, an uneasy consensus led to the granting of associate member status to Indonesia and observer status to the ULMWP.
To dodge questions over Indonesian sovereignty, the MSG leaders agreed that 'the ULMWP be admitted as an observer under the regional and international category representing Melanesians living abroad' (despite the ULMWP representing groups both inside and exiled from West Papua). In the presence of a large delegation led by Indonesian Vice Foreign Minister A.M. Fachir, the island leaders approved 'that associate membership be accorded to Indonesia representing the five Melanesian provinces in Indonesia' (Papua, West Papua, Maluku, North Maluku, and East Nusa Tenggara).
Describing the ULMWP as an 'external non-government organisation', Fiji Prime Minister Bainimarama stated:
31 Ironically, Jakarta has long argued there are no political prisoners in West Papua. Many prisoners refused presidential clemency (which requires an acknowledgement of guilt), arguing that they were falsely convicted for political reasons and that alleged acts -such as raising or displaying the Morning Star flag -were not crimes.
Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua cannot be questioned … the MSG has no choice but to deal with Indonesia in a positive and constructive manner. The best hope for improving the lives of the people of West Papua is to work closely with the Indonesian government, one of the most vibrant democracies in the world (Bainimarama 2015) .
The 20th MSG summit communiqué noted that the 'Indonesian President is someone whom the MSG can dialogue with'.
32 But despite recent initiatives by President Joko Widodo, Indonesia's development policies in West Papua will continue to drive calls for change, as customary landowners fight to protect their land and restrict ongoing immigration. The future role of the five governors in MSG is unclear, given the historic difference between Papua and West Papua (which remained under Dutch administration until the 1960s) and the other three provinces (which were part of Indonesia from independence in 1949). Governors Lukas Enembe of Papua and Bram Atururi of West Papua were both absent from the 2015 summit; as they seek a different political status within Indonesia, more debate is on the cards within the MSG.
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The creation of the ULMWP as a united coalition will also pose diplomatic challenges for Pacific governments, as the MSG observer highlights historic grievances and ongoing human rights violations. ULMWP Secretary-General Octo Mote says observer status is 'a foot in the door' for dialogue between West Papuan nationalists, Melanesian governments and Indonesia: 'We're a nation in waiting, and we're not going away!'
34

Conclusion
The recent flurry of diplomatic activity on decolonisation by MSG and PSIDS is a striking example of ways that new Pacific diplomatic structures have allowed action on questions that governments have been reluctant to address through the Pacific Islands Forum for many years.
Over the next five years, there will be major political and constitutional changes in two Melanesian nations, as New Caledonia and Bougainville vote on a new political status. Under the 1998 Noumea Accord, New Caledonia is scheduled to hold a referendum on self-determination in late 2018, with two other votes possible up until 2022. In a similar period, Bougainville will come to the end of its 10-15 year transition after the 2005 election of the Autonomous Bougainville Government.
These referenda have important implications for neighbours such as Australia, New Zealand and the island members of the Pacific Islands Forum and MSG. The issue of self-determination will again force itself onto the regional agenda.
